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STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, ~——~'-'"" 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890671 CA 
Category 15 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION and NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue 
of Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code, 
This matter originated as an action for divorce brought by 
Plaintiff in her Complaint and by Defendant in his Counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this brief are: 
1. Did the trial court properly divide and distribute the 
parties' property? 
2. Does Appellant have standing to appeal from the trial 
court's distribution of realty? 
3. Was Respondent entitled to the trial court's award of 
$1,000.00 as and for her reasonable attorney's fees? 
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4. Is Respondent entitled to her reasonable attorneyfs fees 
incurred in responding to Appellant's appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The statutory law that is determinative to the issues 
presented in this brief are: 
30-3-3* Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of 
money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party 
and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or defend 
the action. 
30-3-5 Disposition of Property - Maintenance and health care of the 
parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction -
Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties 
UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; ... Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses 
UTAH RULES OP APPELLATE PROCEDURE, Rule 33. Damages for delay or 
frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court 
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL LEVEL 
Trial was held on 7 February, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr., 
Judge. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court 
issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION on 15 February, 1989, addressing the 
major issues of the case and directing counsel to file affidavits 
regarding attorney fees. The Courtfs MEMORANDUM DECISION of 31 July 
awarded Plaintiff $1,000.00 as and for her reasonable attorney's 
fees. The Court entered its DECREE on 13 October, 1989, and its 
AMENDED DECREE on 30 October, 1989. 
B. RELEVANT PACTS 
(All references in this section are to pages and lines of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, TRIAL, i.e. 6:13-7:22 is a 
reference to page 6, line 13 through page 7, line 22 of the 
transcript.) 
Plaintiff, Helen Jayne (Hunter) Walters [Helen], and 
Defendant, Lewis Mark Walters [Mark], were married on 5 October, 
1984, [3:10-25]. They separated when Helen bout this action in 1987 
[11:10-11]. Trial on Helen's Complaint for Divorce was held on 7 
February, 1989. 
The parties originally met in late 1978, slightly less than 6 
years prior to their marriage [29:10-32:8; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. 
At the time they met Helen lived in a mobile home situated in Orem 
[14:1-15:9]. Shortly after they met the parties began living 
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together in Helen's mobile home in Orem [17:9-19:2; 3 2:22-33:6; 
34:4-35:9; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. For a brief time Mark"s son 
lived with them in Orem [32:22-33:6]. Mark and Helen lived in the 
trailer in Orem until 1980 when they moved it to a pad Mark 
purchased in a trailer park in Pleasant Grove, situated at 62 5 
South 50 West [35:10-36:5]. 
Helen was employed at Geneva Steel from before the time they 
met through the time of the trial, except for a time when the plant 
temporarily ceased operations in 1981 and 1982 [36:14-37:7]. Mark 
was employed at Hill Air Force Base from 1967 through the date of 
the trial [84:19-85:2]. His work sometimes took him out of state on 
temporary duty assignments. Mark earned a retirement benefit as a 
result of his employment [85:3-86:2]. 
Between his temporary assignments Mark's base of employment 
was at Hill and his home was Helen's trailer [52:25-53:18]. For the 
years 1979 through 1983, the years the parties cohabited but prior 
to the parties' marriage, Mark listed his permanent address on his 
federal income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
the site of the trailer he occupied with Helen [75:4-8; 76:10-14]. 
Helen had a minor daughter, Shantel, who was 12 years old at 
the time of trial and who had lived with Mark in the parties1 
trailer home from the time the parties first met when she was not 
quite three [39:23-40:18; 59:18-20]. Prior to their marriage the 
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parties agreed that Shantel would use the sir name of Walters at 
school and church rather than Helen's sir name [40:22-43:25]. Mark 
shared responsibility for the financial support of Shantel [59:I8-
60: 16] • Mark listed Shantel as a dependent living with him on his 
1982, 1983, and 1984 federal income tax returns [77:2-78:17]. 
Before they were married, Mark also helped Helen pay for certain 
debts she had accumulated, testifying that he "[d]idn't expect 
nothing [in return]" [86:3-88:10]. 
Shortly before the parties met, Mark began purchasing a parcel 
of realty in Highland, Utah [94:15-24]. Mark kept a second mobile 
home on this property from before the time the parties met through 
October, 1985, when he moved the trailer to a second trailer pad he 
purchased at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, near the site of 
the parties1 home [100:20-101:5]. This second trailer, while 
situated in Highland, was variously described by witnesses as 
either "unlivable" [24:22-25:25], occupied by a renter [27:12-
28:4], or used for storage [53:19-54:17], but never as Mark's 
residence [63:5-12]. 
From the time that Helen's trailer was moved to the pad in 
Pleasant Grove in 1980 through and after the time Mark's trailer 
was moved from Highland to the neighboring pad in Pleasant Grove, 
the parties pooled their monies and efforts to improve the three 
properties with an eye toward eventually using the value of the two 
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trailer properties to invest in building a home in Highland [56:4-
23; 64:9-65:7; 114:14-115:25]. When Helen was laid off from Geneva, 
Mark felt it would be better if she didnft seek substitute work 
because her efforts were needed to maintain and improve their 
properties [45:4-23]. 
They made numerous improvements to the property on which 
Helen's trailer was placed, including concrete driveways and out-
buildings [96:20-97:7]. Mark financed most of these improvements 
while Helen arranged for, supervised, and participated in the work 
[37:15-39:3; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. Helen's earnings were spent 
on utilities, groceries, and "keeping things in the home front 
going" [39:4-19]. They built a large utility building on the 
Highland property [83:9-16]. Again, Helen arranged for and 
participated in the work of laying the pad and water line, erecting 
the building, and installing solar heating [45:24-46:13; 55:14-21]. 
All of the real property was purchased in Mark's name only, 
even the trailer pad bought after the marriage [60:17-61:13]. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Contrary to Appellant's argument that the trial court 
improperly distributed the parties' property (principally 
Appellant's realty and retirement benefits) by erroneously applying 
Section 3 0-1-4.5, Utah Code, to the facts of this case, the trial 
court properly distributed the property under authority of Section 
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30-3-5, Utah Code. It was proper for the trial court to enter a 
finding that the parties lived in a "marriage-like" relationship 
prior to solemnization of their marriage. This finding was not a 
conclusion of law erroneously denominated as a finding of fact. 
Appellant has not marshalled all facts in support of such finding 
and demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous. 
2. Appellant does not have standing to appeal from the trial 
courtfs award to Respondent of interests in his real property as he 
has transferred his interests in such realty prior to this appeal. 
3. The trial court properly awarded Respondent $1,000.00 as 
and for her reasonable attorney fees. Respondent established a need 
for such award in her counsel's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. Her assertion of such need was not challenged by Appellant. 
4. Respondent is entitled to an award of her reasonable 
attorney fees incurred to respond to Appellant's appeal, either by 
virtue of Section 30-3-3, Utah Code or by virtue of Rule 33(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISTRIBUTED THE PARTIES1 PROPERTY 
Appellant argues the trial court erred when it awarded realty 
to Respondent that was held in his name only and was acquired by 
him prior to the date the parties were married. Appellant likewise 
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challenges the trial court's award to Respondent of a share of his 
retirement benefits earned after the parties1 began living together 
but prior to their marriage. Appellant theorizes that the trial 
court made such awards pursuant to Section 30-1-4.5, Utah's "common 
law marriage" statute. 
The court used the phrase "marriage-like relationship" in its 
first MEMORANDUM DECISION and in the FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to describe the parties1 relationship from the 
time it found they fist cohabited (1 January, 198 0) until they were 
married on 5 October, 1984. Appellant relies almost exclusively on 
the use of this phrase for his conclusion that the court applied 
Section 30-1-4.5 to its decision to make the awards to Appellant. 
Interestingly, no citation to that section appears anywhere in the 
record. Respondent didn't plead for relief under the section; 
neither party argued for or against its application; and the trial 
court made no mention of the section either in its MEMORANDUM 
DECISION or in the FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Nevertheless, Appellant urges that the trial court's finding 
that the parties maintained a "marriage-like relationship" prior to 
their marriage was a misapplication of the common law marriage 
statute and as such was actually an erroneous conclusion of law 
disguised as a finding of fact which this court should review for 
correctness. Appellant cites to Layton v Layton, 777 P2nd 504- (Utah 
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App. 1989), for the various reason why Section 30-1-4.5 cannot 
legally apply to the facts of this case. 
However, in using the phrase, the trial court was neither 
explicitly nor implicitly attempting to legitimize the parties1 
common law relationship. Rather, it was characterizing the nature 
of their pre-marital relationship and the extent to which they 
joined their efforts and earnings to acquire and improve their 
assets both before and after their marriage. This is evidenced by 
the court's reference to the various facts supporting this finding 
in paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact. The court correctly and 
properly made a finding of fact when it described the partiesf 
relationship. 
The facts of this case more closely parallel the facts of 
Barber v Barber. 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App. 1990) than they 
do the facts of Lavton. In Layton the parties never married and 
Respondent had been awarded property based on retroactive 
application of Section 30-1-4.5. In Barber the parties lived 
together for approximately two years then married. As in this case, 
in Barber apparently neither party raised Section 3 0-1-4.5 as a 
ground for relief. This court held in Barber that the party seeking 
to prevent the equitable division of property interests acquired 
prior to the marriage "completely ignores the fact that these 
parties were eventually married, and it is well settled that 
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premarital or separate property may, under proper circumstances, be 
subject to equitable division upon divorce." 
"In dividing a marital estate, the trial court has 
considerable discretion to enter equitable orders concerning 
property distribution." Haumont v Haumont, 135 Utah Ad. Rep. 59 
(Utah App. 1990). l "It is well settled that there is no fixed 
formula for the division of marital property, but that the trial 
court has the power to divide property and income so that the 
parties may readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well 
as possible." Munns v Munns, 790 P2nd 116 (Utah App 1990).2 "The 
overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable 
— that property be fairly divided between the parties, given their 
contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the 
time of the divorce." Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2nd 1276 (Utah 
1987). "Certainly, our Supreme Court in analyzing traditional 
property distributions has never limited a wife to recovering only 
what she monetarily contributed to the marriage." Huck v Huck, 73 4 
P2nd 417 (Utah 1986); Martinez v Martinez, 754 P2nd 69 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
1
 At least twelve additional cases decided by this Court and 
three decided by the Utah Supreme Court have made the same ruling 
since 1987. 
2
 This Court has pronounced this same goal in at least nine 
cases since 1987, the Utah Supreme Court in at least three. 
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The Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed the trial 
courtfs authority to divide separate property in Burke v Burke, 73 3 
P2nd 133 (Utah 1987) reasoning as follows3: 
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be 
viewed as separate property, and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain 
the separate property brought to the marriage. Preston v 
Preston, 646 P2nd 705 (Utah 1982). However the rule is 
not invariable. Workman v Workman, 652 P2nd 931 (Utah 
1982) . In fashioning an equitable property division, 
trial courts need consider all of the pertinent 
circumstances. Enalert v Enalert, 576 P2nd 1274 (Utah 
1978). The factors generally to be considered are the 
amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the 
source of the property; the health of the parties; the 
parties1 standard of living, respective financial 
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of 
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties1 
ages at the time of the marriage and of divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary 
relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support to be awarded, [citations] Of 
particular concern in a case such as this is whether one 
spouse has made contribution toward the growth of the 
separate assets of the other spouse and whether the 
assets accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of 
the parties. Preston supra. 
In accordance with Burke, the trial court had before it 
several fact from which it made specific findings why it was 
equitable that portions of the separate property of Mark be 
distributed to Helen including: the trailer home awarded to Helen 
3
 On at least eleven occasions since 1987 this court has 
recognized the principal allowing for distribution of separate 
property in appropriate circumstances; the Utah Supreme Court has 
done so in at least five cases since 1987. 
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had been her home and the home of her minor daughter, Shantel, 
since before the parties became acquainted; after the trailer home 
had been moved to Mark's pad in Pleasant Grove, it was the only 
home from which Shantel has attended school and church; the value 
of all of Mark's separate properties were enhanced by the joint 
efforts of both parties; Helen contributed her labor and her money 
to the value of mark's separate properties; Helen contributed her 
monies to keeping the "home front" going allowing Mark to 
contribute his earnings to improvements on his properties. 
The findings which support an award of some of Mark's separate 
property to Helen also support the finding that the parties' pre-
marital relationship was "marriage-like". Appellant takes issue 
with the use of the phrase but does not address the substance of 
the findings which support the awards to Helen. 
However, Utah appellate courts have proclaimed on several 
occasions that "[w]e will not set aside a trial court's findings of 
fact unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence or we 
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made," Smith v Linmar Energy Corp., 132 Utah Ad. Rep. 52 (Utah 
App. 1990), "and we give due regard to the trial court's 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Terry v 
Price Mun. Corp., 784 P2nd 146 (Utah 1989). "A finding is clearly 
erroneous, whether the action is in equity or in law, id., only if 
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without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous 
view of the law." Linmar, supra. Cited in Williams v Miller, 136 
Utah Ad. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1990).4 
"An appealing party bears the burden of establishing that ... 
the trial court's factual findings upon which the [property] 
division is grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a). Sorensen v Sorensen, 769 P2nd 820 (Utah App. 
1989) ; Stevens v Stevens, 754 P2nd 952 (Utah App. 1988). "To mount 
a successful attack on the trial courtfs factual findings, an 
appellant must marshall all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the findings, Scharf v BMG Corp., 7 00 
P2nd 1068 (Utah 1985), or that its findings are otherwise clearly 
erroneous." Schindler v Schindler, 776 P2nd 84 (Utah App. 1989); 
Riche v Riche. 784 P2nd 465 (Utah App. 1989); Barber, supra; State 
v Mooseman. 135 Utah Ad. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990); Williams v Miller, 
supra. 
Appellant has neither mounted all evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings that Helen is entitled to her property 
4
 This court has recognized this standard of review of 
Findings of Fact in relation to property awards in divorces in at 
least twenty two cases since 1987; the Utah Supreme Court has done 
so in at least five cases in that period. 
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awards nor demonstrated that, even in the light most favorable to 
the findings they are insufficient to support those awards. Without 
such marshalling and demonstration this court should not set aside 
the trial court's findings. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT IS WITHOUT STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISTRIBUTION OP REALTY 
Trial in this matter was held on 7 February, 1989. The trial 
court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION on 15 february, 1989. On 28 
February, 1989, Mark transferred to Stan Sapp, by Warranty Deed, 
all of his interests in the realty situated in Highland and awarded 
to him in the MEMORANDUM DECISION. On 31 March, 1989, Mark Quit-
Claimed to Vera L. Walters all of his interests in the real 
property situated in the trailer court in Pleasant Grove upon which 
Helen's trailer was placed and which was awarded to Helen in the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. Also on 31 March, 1989, Mark transferred to 
Vera L. Walters, by Warranty Deed, all of his interests in the 
other trailer lot situated in the trailer court in Pleasant Grove 
and awarded to him in the MEMORANDUM DECISION (see Addendum). The 
court's DECREE OF DIVORCE was entered on 13 October, 1989. The 
court's AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE was entered on 30 October, 1989, 
which amended the original Decree only by adding the words "but 
excepting" in paragraph 10 to clarify the court's ruling regarding 
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disposition of the parties1 personal property. Appellant's NOTICE 
OF APPEAL was filed on 9 October, 1989. 
n[E]ither party, or even the court on its own motion, may 
properly raise standing for the first time on appeal." Wade v 
Burke, 131 Utah Ad. Rep. 94 (Utah App. 1990); Blodaett v Zions 
First National Bank, 752 P2nd 901 (Utah App. 1988); Terracor v Utah 
Bd. of State Lands. 716 P2nd 796 (Utah 1986); Utah Restaurant 
Ass'n. v Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P2nd 1159 (Utah 1985); 
Health Tecna Corp. v Sound Sys. Int'l., Inc., 588 P2nd 169 (Utah 
1978). "The Utah Supreme Court has established three tests to 
determine whether a litigant has standing. Blodgett, supra; 
Terracor, supra; Jenkins v Swan, 675 P2nd 1145 (Utah 1983). 
(1) The party must be able to show that he or she 
has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
him or her a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute. (2) If the party does not have standing under 
the first criterion, he or she may have standing if no 
one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the 
case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all 
unless that particular party has standing to raise the 
issue. (3) Even though the party may not have standing 
under the first two criteria, he or she may, 
nevertheless, have standing if the issues are unique and 
of such great public importance that they ought to be 
decided in the furtherance of the public interest. 
Blodaett, supra; Terracor, supra; If a party does not 
qualify under any of these three tests, we will not 
render an advisory opinion, but will dismiss the action. 
See Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Comm'n., 624 P2nd 1138 
(Utah 1981); Wade, supra. 
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In this case Mark stands in a similar position as Ms, Purcell 
in Blodaett who quit-claimed her interests in the disputed property 
prior to bringing her appeal and was found to have no standing. His 
position is also similar to Mr. Burkefs in Wade who claimed no 
interest in disputed property and acquired none as a result of the 
trial court's judgment and also was found to have no standing. As 
with Ms. Purcell and Mr. Burke, Mark now has no personal stake in 
the disputed real properties sufficient to confer standing under 
the first criterion. As with Mr. Burke, neither does Mark qualify 
under the second prong of the standing test because he has no 
greater interest in the disputed property than the present record 
title holders, Vera L. Walters and Stan Sapp. Thirdly, as this is a 
private dispute, it does not carry "sufficient public importance to 
confer standing upon appellant under the final prong." Wade, supra. 
Standing is properly raised for the first time in this brief. 
Because Mark has no standing to appeal the trial court's rulings 
concerning the real property he has previously transferred to third 
parties, this court can only issue an advisory opinion regarding 
interests in the realty and should not entertain his appeal as it 
regards such realty. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO THE TRIAL COURT1S AWARD TO HER OP 
$1000.00 AS AND FOR HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellant contests the trial court's award of $1,000.00 to 
Helen for attorney fees claiming she did not establish her need for 
the award. However, Appellant's challenge to the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to Respondent fails for two reasons. 
First, Appellant has waived his right to challenge the award 
by his failure to lodge his objection below. He cannot raise the 
issue anew in this appeal. This court has recently cited with 
authority the general rule that "'[i]t would be manifestly unjust 
to permit a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error has been committed' and then 'if he loses, come forward1 
claiming error." Onyeabor v Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P2nd 525 (Utah 
App. 1990), citing Hill v Cloward, 377 P2nd 186 (Utah 1962). See 
also, Cunningham v Cunningham, 690 P2nd 549 (Utah 1984); Edgar v 
Wagner, 572 P2nd 405 (Utah 1977); In Re Ekker, 432 P2nd 45 (Utah 
1967).5 
5
 Several recent cases involving appeals from criminal 
convictions have also applied this rule requiring preservation of 
issues for appeal. See, State v Carter, 707 P2nd 656 (Utah 1985); 
State v Arroyo, 770 P2nd 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v Johnson, 
774 P2nd 1141 (Utah 1989); State v Schlosser, 774 P2nd 1132 (Utah 
1989); State v Pacheco, 778 P2nd 26 (Utah App. 1989); State v Webb, 
790 P2nd 65 (Utah App. 1990); State v Marshall. 132 Utah Ad. Rep. 
45 (Utah App. 1990). 
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In this matter, at the direction of the trial court as 
indicated in its first MEMORANDUM DECISION, Respondent's counsel 
submitted an affidavit setting forth the basis, amount, and 
justification for attorney's fees. Appellant made no objection to 
the affidavit and claimed no error at the trial level as regards 
the claim or the award of attorney's fees. As Appellant has failed 
to preserve this claim of error now raised for the first time in 
this appeal, this court should refuse to address the claim. 
Second, should this court decide Appellant has properly 
preserved this claim, it must determine if Respondent established a 
need for the award. Appellant has argued that because Respondent 
admitted in the affidavit that she was totally self supportive from 
her earnings at Geneva Steel and because the trial court found that 
neither party was in need of the continuing financial support of 
the other "either in the form of alimony or child support," she was 
not in need of the award. In so arguing, Appellant is equating the 
need required for an award of alimony with need required for the 
award of attorney's fees. Appellant cites no cases in support of 
that proposition. And, while this court has issued many cases 
addressing attorney's fees in domestic cases, none seems to have 
specifically stated what quantum of need is necessary to support 
such an award. It therefore appears that Appellant's burden in this 
regard is to establish that the trial court's finding that 
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Respondent needed the award was "clearly erroneous" in the manner 
set forth in Point I hereinabove. Appellant has failed to do so and 
the trial court's finding should be sustained. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OP HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
In the recent past this court has ruled on the issue of 
awarding attorney fees incurred on appeal, variously basing its 
decision to grant or deny an award either on the general authority 
of Section 30-3-3, Utah Code, or on Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure as a sanction for a frivolous appeal. 
In Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365 (Utah App. 1988) this court 
ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when 
an appeal is obviously without merit and has been 
taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and 
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of the 
lower court; increased costs of litigation; and 
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court, 
[citation] Therefore,we award costs and attorney fees on 
appeal to [respondent]. 
The Porco court so ruled even though it "recognize[d] that 
sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious 
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions." 
Likewise, in Fife v Fife, 777 P2nd 512 (Utah App. 1989), 
Barber, supra, and Hurt v Hurt, 136 Utah Ad. Rep. 3 6 (Utah App. 
1990) this court imposed sanctions in the form of attorney fees 
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incurred on appeal because of frivolous appeals. In Hurt this court 
found the appeal to be only partially frivolous. All of these four 
cases were remanded for a determination of the amount to be 
awarded. In none of these four cases was this court concerned with 
the respondent's need for the award. 
In contrast, when this court has awarded fees under Section 
3 0-3-3 it has done so only when the respondent has established both 
need for and reasonableness of the fees incurred. In Rasband v 
Rasband, 752 P2nd 1313 (Utah App. 1988) this court found that the 
award of attorney fees below was proper but remanded for the trial 
court to determine both the need for and reasonableness of the fees 
incurred on appeal. It instructed that if the trial court found 
both factors it should make an award under 3 0-3-3. 
Later, in Mauahan v Maughan, 770 P2nd 156 (Utah App, 1989), 
Weston v Weston, 773 P2nd 408 (Utah App. 1989), and Ostler v 
Ostler, 789 P2nd 713 (Utah App. 1990), this court remanded only for 
a determination because respondent had already established need 
below. 
In four cases this court has refused to award attorney fees 
for appeal; each for a different reason. In Riche, supra, the 
respondent was denied attorney fees below. But, because respondent 
made a credible argument that her financial condition had 
deteriorated since trial, the matter was remanded with instructions 
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to determine if there had been a change of circumstances since the 
trial. If the trial court so found, it was to then determine and 
award a reasonable amount. In Baashaw v Bacrshaw, 788 P2nd 1057 
(Utah App.1990), this court denied an award of attorney fees for 
appeal because the trial court had denied an award below and 
respondent had not shown a asserted a change of circumstances since 
trial. In Munns, supra, this court found that the appeal was not 
frivolous and awarded no attorney fees. Apparently respondent made 
no request for an award under 30-3-3. In Haumont, supra, this court 
denied an award of attorney fees on appeal although the trial court 
had awarded respondent a portion of her attorney fees below. This 
court did so because it had found that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in its award of attorney fees. 
Here, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in this appeal under Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined by 
Porco. Under this Rule Respondent seeks either the entire amount of 
her reasonable fees or such amount as may be determined to have 
been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court finds 
frivolous, if this court finds the appeal only partially frivolous 
as per Hurt. 
Alternatively, Respondent seeks an award of her reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in this appeal under the court's general 
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authority pursuant to Section 30-3-3. If this court determines that 
this Section is the appropriate vehicle for the award, it is urged 
that this case closely parallels Mauahan, Weston, and Ostler in 
that the trial court has already determined Respondent's need for 
the award and this court need only remand for a determination of 
the reasonable amount to be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the findings and judgment of the 
trial court, award Respondent her reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred to respond to Appellantfs appeal, under either Rule 3 3(a) 
or Section 30-3-3, and remand for a determination of the reasonable 
amount of such award. 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1990. 
T^ ^—-
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
First MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Second MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
WARRANTY DEED (Lot 11, Plat "D", Pleasant Grove Mobile Home 
Estates) 
WARRANTY DEED (Highland property) 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT '^ F[;?
 /p 
. <P;l 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY &P 
********************* 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years, before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintifffs trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
property such as would be expected of a married couple. The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years or months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement 
benefits. 
The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property. The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear. 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
Dated this 15th day of February, 1989 
BY 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2408 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees 
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00 
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989. 
BY 
cc: Thomas H. Means, Esq, 
Robert L. Moody, Esq, 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84 603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
V 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) No. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 Octobei:, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minorfs only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove', Utah. At that 
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same time the parties moved Plaintifffs mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident• 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 62 5 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintifffs aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
74 6 West 600 North, Orem, Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Courtfs acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux's assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost, 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $2 0,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000.00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987). The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually, 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital 
relationship. 
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00 
for attorneyfs fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint. 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
14 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties' 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant. 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
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(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this t? day of -At*gsst, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
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Robert L. Moody 
Attorney for Defendant 
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grantee 
for the sum of 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah, • according to the official plat thereof 
on file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
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hereby CONVEY mad WARRANT to 
Vera L. Walters ^ -
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of Anerican Pork, Utah , County of Utah State of Utah 
for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations—-DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Lot 11, Plat "D", Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
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Signed in the presence ot 
Lewis **M*. Walters 
STATE OF UTAH, > 
County of U ™ J *** 
On the 31 day of March , 19 89 
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Lewis M. Walters 
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LEVIS MARK WALTERS 
.County of Utah 
to 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
STAN SAPP 
of 775 North 300 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah 
-Ten Dollars and other valuable consideration 
grantee 
for the sum of 
- DOLLARS, 
the following described tract 
State of Utah: 
o* land in - Utah County. 
Commencing 10 Chains west and 583 feet north fron the southeast 
corner of the southwest quarter of Section 2, Township 5 South, 
Range 1 F.ast, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence west 132 feet; 
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day of 
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Attorney for Pla int i ff 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84 
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IN THE FOl JUDICIAL DISTRK OURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff,. ; 
v ; 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ; 
Defendant. ] 
I AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT CF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
STATE OF TTTAr 
County 
Y -:r ; ' ' , aeposes as follows: 
1. My name is Thomas •* * run; ' :;> •; a* torne, . :• good 
standing, 1icensed L>V t ho ntah State Dcir 
^
Vt
* * .'. ->\ji'i ..; i - -. . h^ i^.iqaiiwi : .:«.- character 
presented : :.. - action. 
1
 I •' -iLtorney of record for the party as indicated above. 
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3. In my capacity as attorney of record for such party I have 
reviewed the file and record of this matter, have consulted with my 
client and others, have advised my client by telephone and office 
visits, have prepared and filed pleadings, have discovered the 
facts attendant to the issues, and have appeared in a 
representative capacity for and with my client at each and all 
hearings as may be indicated by the file of this matter. 
Specifically, actions necessitated by the exigencies of this matter 
include the following: 
Ex Parte Motions for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause, 
Affidavits and Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause, meetings and consultation with Sheriff, 
Hearing of Order To Show Cause, Stipulation, Preliminary 
Injunction, Order, consultation with Pleasant Grove 
detective and Pleasant Grove City Attorney regarding 
Defendant's first violation of Temporary Restraining 
Order, pre-trial hearing, Pre-Trial Order, Affidavits in 
support of and second Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
second Order to Show Cause, hearing on second Order to 
Show Cause, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause, consultation with 
Pleasant Grove Police and Utah County Attorney regarding 
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Uetendant " i\ second violation of Preliminary Injunction, 
three sets of Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and 
Certif icates ol Servici
 (, I hi " " *'• " 
Defendantf s Interrogatories, rev iew oi records o t Utah 
County Recorder, four Lis Pendens telephone ^nsultation 
\\ i I hi 11 in | [ M i l if 11 i 1 i 'M 1 i * • _>u - ' ;. : a n w i t h 
real estate appraiser,, telephone conspiration with banks 
and credit union regarding accounts, multiple meetings 
c 11 i< I c: c: i 1 su] tati oi is A i 11 i :i i ivesti g a t o r
 r research of case 
law, Subpoenas for records and appearances {d , telephone 
consultatic vith Alpine School District ^^^i •.••• 
i eder.il I i *:o nrivacy 1 .tw I : CA Sect .un i.-:.-,. iai ] and 
Motion to Compel for response t. Subpoena, consultation 
with parties' tax prep.i -*-: \ • . - *• - : • iii! ' ". lvr,\ 
i etui: lis, tr i a ] preparat^ci, * , i :.
 w Release of Lis 
Pendens, drafts of final Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Decree of Divorce, Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order, Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees, 
4 \ : <. .a h services, 
consultations, and representations at the rate of $60,00 per hour. 
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5. I have dedicated 77,52 hours to date in representation of 
my client in this matter. 
6. As per said fee agreement, and through 19 March, 198 9, my 
client has incurred the following expenses in this action: 
attorney fees $4651.00 
advances-service costs 27.00 
filing fees 87.00 
recorders fees 40.00 
witness fees 14.00 
accounting costs 32.00 
investigations 500.00 
appraisals 450.00 
total $5801.00 
7. To date my client has expended $1782.00 toward the above-
noted expenses of this action. 
8. The present unpaid balance of the expenses of this action 
is $4019.00 all of which balance constitutes unpaid attorney's 
fees. 
9. I believe such rate and such total fees at this stage of 
the proceedings to be reasonable, given the amount in controversy, 
the time necessarily expended by me in the matter, the relative 
complexity of the matter, and the comparable rates charged and time 
that would likely be dedicated to such representation by other 
4 
competent attorneys 1 icensed t o pra* :l. i».''.' in "' hi.s do'Utrt, •' 1 n < I I 
further believe the various actions taken in Plaintiff's behalf in 
the prosecution of her cl ai ms have been reasonable, necessary, 
supported by good • ::ai is e , a i 1 d i 1 c • t f i:i :: rought in ha.-; -
 : 11h 
nor for delay nor" harassment. 
1 , n M -M--.it rni j mi | MM, mil be as set: lorth in a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, if appropriate. 
11 , Your affi an t proffers that Plaintiff is totally self-
supported from income earned from her present employment at Geneva 
Steel, that in addition J ; * *• ' - . •: ^  Jl ihle 
for I :I ii = s t i ytal support n; .;._-: daughter Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) whom she has custody of. and ;- - partially supporti ng 
another id1"11 ' Mi'ihh»i ,- ,IHJI.» -.-•-.. * Lth 
Plaintif 1 . *,.., maintains part-time employmen4 *;r:; ianitorial 
service, an./, wh*. :;.-, afflicted wit!" a disease wnicn \ '-=>•-* •** 
prevents . time employment and frjn; living 
aicne, ^ -uiiidin-Barre Syndrome. 
I.' I Nit.? 1. rial 1.11 I; his matter Plaintiff gave testimony of 
her total gross income for 1988. It is your affiant's recollection 
that said total was $26, ». 
13. The legal basis for an award of attorney's fees is Section 
30-3-3, Utah Code and the established law regarding awards of 
attorney's fees in actions for divorce as set forth in decisions 
such as Kerr v Kerr. 610 P2nd 1380, Beals v Beals, 682 P2nd 862, 
Cabrera v Cottrel. 694 P2nd 622, Tallev v Tallev, 739 P2nd 83, 
Newmeyer v Newmeyer. 745 P2nd 1276, Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365, 
Rasband v Rasband. 752 P2nd 1313, Aspar v Aspar 753 P2nd 978, 
Andersen v Andersen. 757 P2nd 476, Sorensen v Sorensen, 102 UAR 14, 
and Mauahan v Mauahan, 102 UAR 44. I believe Plaintiff justly 
deserves an award of attorney's fees and that such award to 
Plaintiff is supported by the facts and circumstances of this 
matter and the statute and decisions above cited. 
Dated this 'TO day of I^Y^c fr^ 1989 
ldinas H Thom  . Means 
A f f i a n t 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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foregoing Affidavit. 
.»• Kin "M» I ' v i i jGd o x e c u l i ; , « , * In 
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Notary Public 
(seal) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted 
he/she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT on the following, in the manner prescribed by Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing the same in 
the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all postage and 
other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the following 
person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-noted. 
Dated this day of ^L^l/i/j , 1990. 
UTAH C0URTrt)F APPEALS 
230 South 500 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
Attorney for Appellant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah, 84 604 
